It was originally the intention of the author to investigate in depth the Wittfogel-Schwartz debate of 1960 as it appeared in the China Quarterly (Jan. 1960). The investigation was to encompass each point of contention in the debate, i.e., the role of the peasantry in the Chinese Revolution, the originality of Mao's thought, the Hunan Report as reflecting the gist of the 'Maoist' policy: it is one of the clearest portraits of 'Maoism' in its formative stage. However, this is a task too monumental to be efficiently covered in a paper of this type. Furthermore, many books are now available which expose many of the questionable points mentioned in the debate. For example, Arthur A. Cohen's The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, Stuart Schram's The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, Schram's article in the China Quarterly (Ap. 1964) "Mao's Deviation in 1927", North's M.N. Roy's Mission to China are some of the major works in English. This, of course, does not take into account the major works available in other languages, i.e., Japanese.

In light of these facts, it has been decided to investigate two major controversial points of the debate which, hitherto, have not been efficiently clarified.

a) Schwartz recorded in his book Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (1961) that "There is every reason to believe that even at this time Mao Tse-tung represented a marginal exotic trend within the Chinese Communist movement."  

The author believed that there is every reason to believe that at that time (1927) Mao Tse-tung did not represent an exotic trend in the Chinese Communist movement. On the contrary it is intended to show that the Human Report is not an original report of Mao. In addition, the second point to be examined is a continuation of point (a).

b) It is believed that enough evidence exists which can prove that Mao remained loyal to the Comintern until after the 'Autumn Crops Uprising' in the Fall of 1927. It is surmised that his disenchantment with the Comintern paralleled his rejection from the Politburo in November 1927.
Those travelers who were fortunate enough to have visited China during the latter part of 1926 and the early months of 1927, found it in a state of political, economic and social upheaval.

The Northern Expeditions were being auspiciously carried out in order to quell the rebellious warlords in the north. Also, at that time one could not help but be made aware of the multitude of peasant uprisings around the countryside. "1926 [was] a year in which the peasant associations had achieved spectacular success." Meanwhile, in Moscow Stalin was not without his own personal problems. He was involved in a political life-death struggle with Leon Trotsky, in which the Comintern's China policy was one point of contention. One can see why Stalin was opposed to admitting failures in those policies. Therefore, all failures in the Comintern line in China were attributed to the ineptitude of the young Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—policy directives were correct but the CCP was not applying them properly.

Again, in China, another political upheaval occurred to which great import must be given with respect to the fate of the CCP. This was the split in the Kuomintang (KMT) into the Right faction (as represented by Chi‡ang Kai-shek) and the Left faction, otherwise known as the Wuhan government.

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1 Ibid., p.74.
The left KMT severed relations with the Nationalist (NST) Government of Chiang Kai-shek in February 1927. It was to this segment of the KMT that the CCP was drawn because it was to this segment that Stalin, through the Comintern representative, ordered the CCP to ally itself. All pleas, therefore, to work within the KMT Party were, in essence, to become pleas to work within the guidelines set by the left-KMT. The rationale behind the directive was to work within the KMT Party structure in order to facilitate Communist penetration to the masses. It is important to note that, in time, the KMT Party leadership was to be 'replaced' by Communist leaders and, therefore, the Communist party would fall heir to the already-existing KMT Party organization.

In China (the field) there were two important Comintern representatives, Borodin and Roy (head of the Indian Communist Party). These two representatives, as North pointed out in his book, *M.N. Roy's Mission to China*, were at odds over the policy directives coming to them from Moscow. Recalling that Moscow was situated thousands of miles away from the seat of the Comintern's field operations in China, the policy interpretations, coupled with prevailing daily crises in China, led to an important divergence of view between Borodin and Roy. To be sure, the field representative of the Comintern could at times be considered a free agent. Whereas, Borodin was definitely the spokesman for the majority of the CC of the CCP, Roy
assumed the unofficial role of spokesman of the minority. As the official representative of the Comintern, Borodin's views carried considerable weight in the CCP. It might be helpful to note at this point that throughout the CCP's formative years (especially 1921-27), whenever there existed a divergence of views between the Comintern and members of the CC of the CCP, it was the Comintern line to which the Party adhered. This, of course, was the unwritten policy of the CCP.

The following comparison of the views of the two representatives are now in order, in order to make the reader aware of the dichotomy which existed within the Comintern line.

BORODIN'S MAJOR POINTS

1. The present position of the Left Kuomintang is entirely acceptable [to the CCP]. They do not display any deviationist tendencies or shortcomings. The mistakes in the past were due to the extreme nature of the workers' and peasants' movement. Actually, the leadership in this movement was not that of the peasants, but of the Society of Elder Brothers... and bandits.

2. We must yield to the Kuomintang in order to be able to continue collaboration with it; if we break with the Kuomintang, the Chinese revolution will suffer defeat.

3. Collaboration with the Kuomintang means collaboration with its CC, since the present composition of the CC is quite acceptable to us. The withdrawal from it, or its overthrow, would be equivalent to a break or a political coup. A tendency in favor of a break is evident among some of our party members (for example, the representative of Comrade R[or]).

4. Reduction of rent, elimination of usury and the introduction of local self-government in the countryside—these measures represent the agrarian revolution.

5. The CC of the CCP must issue jointly with the workers' and peasants' organizations an appeal to the masses urging them to follow the orders of the CC of the Kuomintang and of...
the Nationalist government which require the discontinuation of the excesses in the workers' and peasants' movement, as well as the recently issued orders.

ROY'S MAJOR POINTS

1. The CC of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist government no longer the Left Wing; rather, they support the interests of the T'u-hao, the gentry, landlords, and imperialists. We must direct the people to overthrow them.

2. The overthrow of the present CC of the Kuomintang does not mean as yet a political coup.

3. At present we must aim at the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants...

4. The CC of the CCP must immediately an appeal to the people, and explain in it the reactionary nature of all orders which had been issued recently by the CC of the Kuomintang and its government. These orders aim at the suppression of the workers' and peasants' movement and the defense of the feudal system.

In light of this comparison, it can most assuredly be assumed that each spokesman had a following among members of the CCP hierarchy. Therefore, unilinear policy interpretation had, in fact, become multilinear and policy which would have ordinarily been considered heretical in nature may well have fallen into the "expanded" Comintern line.

The term 'expanded' is used in this case, due to the multiplicity of views held by committee representatives. In addition, the multiplicity was furthered by the logistics problem which existed between Moscow and China. Policy interpretations could not be immediately verified by a simple telephone call to Stalin in Moscow. Divergent views existed in the field until further guidance and/or clarification could be received. In this particular instance, the guidance was received two days later than it had been requested by Roy.

2 Ibid.
requested by Roy. The response was Stalin's telegram of June 1, 1927, which supported Roy's interpretation of the Comintern line, but this was not to be accepted by Borodin. It was Borodin, who possessed the larger following within the CCP and who chose to void the telegram and to adhere to his original pronouncements. His reply to Moscow was "Orders received. Shall obey as soon as we can do so." It was abundantly clear that no immediate attempt would be made by his faction to make Stalin's desire operative. Borodin then proceeded to gather support from other Comintern representatives and Chinese Communists in order to request the recall of Roy from the field.

Questions must now be asked about the views espoused by Mao Tse-tung at that time. Was Mao ready to disregard the directives of the official representative of the Communist International? What was his position with respect to the peasants and the agrarian revolution? Such questions are fundamental and require a more detailed examination. The examination should best begin in the Spring of 1927.

Mao Tse-tung--1927

At the time of the split into two factions of the KMT "The Chairman of the National Peasant Federation was none other than Mao Tse-tung who had recently presented his report on the peasantry in Hunan and now it became his duty, under party discipline [e.g., to follow the pronouncements of Borodin], to discourage the very kind of action on the countryside that he had just finished advocating."

2 Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958, pp.138-39)
3 Ibid, p. 102. Also, Roy pp. 915.
The 'Report' to which Roy referred in the preceding quotation was The Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (henceforth, 'The Report') which was written in February 1927 by Mao Tse-tung.

Benjamin Schwartz placed great emphasis on this 'Report' in his book, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, when he attributed to Mao the fact that, at the period during which the 'Report' was written, he "represented a marginal exotic trend within the Chinese Communist movement". After having performed even a rudimentary investigation of this point, it would be difficult to accept this view.

Firstly, Mao's opening statement of the 'Report' refutes one of Schwartz's early assumptions in which he stated that "The 'Report' is essentially a reflection of his [Mao's] experience during 1926...". Mao, however, asserts that "During my visit to Hunan I made a first hand investigation of conditions in five counties... In the thirty-two days from January 4 to February 5, I called together fact-finding conferences in villages and county towns... and I listened attentively to their reports and collected a great deal of material." This discrepancy makes one wonder whether or not Dr. Schwartz might have been "more Maoist than Mao"!

1*In the debate, which appeared in the Jan. 1960 China Quarterly, Schwartz apparently plays down the original importance he assigned the 'Report' in his book. Refer to the CQ mentioned (pp.40-41).*
2 Schwartz, op. cit., p.78.
3 Ibid., p.74.
Secondly, in order to test the validity of Schwartz's "exotic trend hypothesis", it should suffice to examine the two resolutions (or theses) issued at two different sessions held by the CC of the CCP, the former held in Shanghai and the latter in Moscow. The first session, which will be mentioned as a matter of fact, is the Second Enlarged Plenum of the CC of the CCP. This was held during July 12-18, 1926. The points expressed in this resolution possess a striking similarity to many points expressed by Mao in his "Report". It is not the intention of the author to dwell on this session but to refer the reader to the November-December (1926) session of the Seventh Extraordinary Plenum of the Executive Committee (EC) of the Comintern. (These theses are omitted in Schwartz Documentary History).

Comparison of the "Fourteen Great Achievements" in the "Report" to the theses of the Seventh Plenum should tend to undermine the contention that Mao, at this time, represented an "exotic trend". It is surmised that Mao really operated within the Comintern guidelines until the end of 1927 and that, during the Roy-Borodin polemics, he favored the views of Roy. Once the polemic was unilaterally ended by Borodin, Mao, as previously cited, sided with the official Comintern representative.

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3 North, M.N. Roy's Mission to China, p.139-146.
4 This would, thus, make him a right-wing element according to Roy.
Mao in the Spring of 1927 apparently followed the Comintern line with respect to the peasants and their associations. He also towed the line with respect to the CCP alliance to the left KMT and all points that such an alliance might entail. In May and June 1927, while peasants were revolting in many provinces, especially Hunan, and, while Roy was in direct opposition to the Comintern leadership, Borodin reasserted his contention that the CCP was to maintain their alliance with the left KMT at all costs, including the probable loss of the agrarian revolution. How did Mao react to the Comintern at this time? According to Roy, whose viewpoints should have had some appeal to Mao, "Mao... had to discourage the very kind of action in the countryside that he had just finished advocating."¹ Nevertheless, it is assumed that Mao "reluctantly" changed his policy in June 1927 from that which he had pronounced in the Report in February of that year for the sake of party unity.

"In the beginning of 1927, events happened in China with amazing rapidity. The situation was as exciting as it was bewildering."² This rapidity of which Roy spoke had not in the least diminished by the summer or fall months. In mid-July the Wuhan Government, in a move of reconciliation towards the Right KMT, discarded and outlawed its ally, the CCP. However, still clinging the idea it would be best to work under the "flag" of the KMT,

¹ North, op. cit., p.102.
² Roy, op. cit., p.443.
³ J. Ch'en, op.cit., p.170.
the CCP created the KMT-Revolutionary Committee, headed by
Mme. Sun Yat-sen.¹

One can see that each time there was a change in alliance
between the CCP and, initially, the KMT, followed by the left-KMT
and, finally, by the rump left KMT (KMT-RC), the party structure
and power base to which the CCP allied itself grew smaller and,
consequently, weaker. What then was the purpose of operating
under the KMT (in actuality, KMT-RC) flag? Was this alliance
to serve as the legitimizer for the CCP involvement in the
national revolution? It should, also, be mentioned that with
the outlawing of the CCP, came the commencement of the White
Terror aimed at the Communists and communist-sympathizers. By
this time Mao may well have entertained thoughts which countered
the Comintern directives but, as it may become more apparent
with the investigation of the "Autumn Crop Uprising" period, he
was still not ready to strike out on his own and, thereby, negate
what appeared to be an ineffectual and potentially fatal Comintern
China policy.

After months of adhering to the zigzagging pattern of Comintern
policy, serious doubts were raised, within the CCP, concerning
the wisdom of the Comintern.² Among those who questioned the value
of this organization was, most probably, Mao Tse-tung. Perhaps,
with these blatant failures of the CC of the CCP and the Comintern,
Mao began to seek alternative policies. Whatever these thoughts
may have been, they were apparently shelved in the month of August.

It was in this month that the August 7th Conference of the
CC of the CCP was held, a Conference which ushered out Chén Tu-hsiu
and ushered in Chiu Ch'iu-p'ai. Mao was present as a member

¹ J. Ch'en, op. cit.; ² C. Brinton, op. cit., p. 134-35.
of the Central Committee and was at that time a "fellow-traveller of the Chui Ch'iu-pai line. This line asserted that "The KMT was still the proper political vehicle—but that it should be reorganized by the communists into a 'genuine organization of the working masses of town and country'... The Conference also censured Tse-tung... for his 'opportunistc' directives to the peasants after May 1927, but he was given the task of planning and directing the Autumn Harvest Uprisings in Hunan and Kiangsi. Why was Mao censured for his post-May directives to the peasants in the month of August? This was obviously a slight reprimand, because he was close to Chiu, who had fallen heir to the party mantle. Might not the fact that even a slight reprimand of Mao at that time support the contention that Mao had sympathized with Roy in the Roy-Borodin polemic. This may have caused some trouble among those who supported the Borodin interpretation from the start of their argument in early May 1927? Although Mao sided with Borodin, finally, he had made himself a suspicious CC member.

Evidently, Mao's 'opportunistc' directives were not considered overly opportunistic and he, in turn, received the leadership of an extremely important party operation—the Autumn Uprisings.

With these occurrences at hand, it would be difficult for anyone, including Professor Schwartz, to assign to Mao the role

1 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 78.
3 T.A. Huang, China Quarterly, "Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's Autobiographical Writings", Jan-Mar 1965, p. 179, footnotes # 2 & 3.
of a "heretic" operating within the Comintern or the CCP.

The Autumn Harvest Uprising

In mid August Mao, with the blessings of the CC of the CCP, travelled to Hunan Province where he was sent to organize the "Autumn Harvest Uprising". The "Uprising" started successfully during the first week of September. After initial signs of communist military success, Chang'sha became panic-stricken. However, the successful occupation of that city was never realized, because the expected revolt of the workers (in that city never occurred). The entire "Uprising" proved to be abortive and, as a reprimand for his failure, Mao was censured and was removed from the Politburo. Obviously, this was more than a "slight reprimand". In addition, the November Plenum of the CC of the CCP also removed Ch'u Ch'iu-pai from the role of leader of the party. It is interesting to note that "similar (simultaneous military) attempts," according to Jerome Ch'en, "were made in Haifeng and Lufeng in Kwantung under P'eng Pai", and in other provinces by other "militarists". However, no mention had been made by the CC of the CCP about P'eng Pai's actions. One must ask why Mao's actions had been censured, while those of P'eng Pai remained unmentioned.

The fact of the matter was that P'eng Pai, in either the month of October or November 1927, set up peasant soviets in the Haifeng-Lufeng area (September 19) was the date of Comintern's

1 Ch'en, op. cit., p. 132.
2 Ibid.
3 Authors have not been in agreement on this date.
approval of the setting up of peasant soviets). Meanwhile, what had Mao accomplished for the cause? Mao had failed in his mission and failures, especially at that time, were not to be tolerated.

Returning to the Moscow scene, one would, again, find Stalin politically parrying the attacks of the Opposition (Trotsky) against the Comintern's China policy failures. Therefore, the Soviet press was most probably prone to issue favorable reports coming from China. Schram reported that "The Soviet press judgements in August to November 1927 were more favorable towards the Nan'chang Uprisings and those of Mao, et. al. , in Hunan than was the CCP. This may be because the Soviet press was looking for things with which they could glorify and justify the Stalin Policy..."2 In addition, "The 15th Congress of the Russian Party was scheduled for December and Stalin craved for a victory in China that might redound to his credit."3

Professor Schwartz implied that Mao was prepared to operate outside the Comintern directives at the time of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings. He wrote that "according to Mao, however, the Central Committee [CCP] had opposed his program even before the failure had become manifest."4 This is followed by a reference to Mao's adoption of the slogan of "organized soviets". The implication made was that Mao was basically opposed to the Comintern line and the CCP line. However, this was obviously not the case.

1 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 102.
3 Ch'en, op. cit., p. 135.
In an interview with Edgar Snow in 1936, Mao listed his objectives in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the following manner.

I was sent to Chang'sha to organise(sic) the movement which later became known as the Autumn Crop Uprising. My programme there called for the realisation (sic) of five points.

1. Complete severance of the Provincial Party from the KMT.
2. Organization (sic) of a peasant-worker revolutionary army.
3. Confiscation of the property of small, middle, as well as great, landlords.
4. Setting up the power of the Communist Party in Hunan, independent of the KMT.
5. Organization of soviets.

The fifth point at that time was opposed by the Comintern, and not till later did it advance as a slogan.1 (underscore mine).

The preceding sentences tend to show that Mao, albeit in retrospect, reasserted his basic adherence to the Comintern line on all points but one, the organization of soviets.

Schram, like Schwartz, also attributed to Mao the originality of action in the Uprising. It is postulated that this fact can summarily be attributed to Mao without further investigation.

After the abortive Uprising, Mao found himself in the countryside with a band of armed followers. This proved to be reliance on the peasantry. The final coup de grâce to Mao's affinity to the Comintern and the CC of the CCP most probably occurred when he was censured and relieved of his Politburo position in November 1927. As a matter of fact, this was also the date of the ousting of the Ch'u Ch'iu-pai leadership of the party.2 In support of this contention the following statement of Mao Tse-tung is offered.

1 Schram, op.cit., p.59.
2 Ch'ên, op.cit., p.134.
The " 'Left' sentiment, which continued to rise after the 7th August meeting, became a 'Left' line of reckless action (adventurism) and for the first time brought the 'Left' line into a dominant position in the Party's central leading body. Jerome Ch'ên asserted that Mao could only see this 'Left' line in retrospect but issue must be taken with this point. Mao's post-July 1927 actions tend to show his increased alienation from the CC of the CGP, an alienation which culminated in his November censure.

CONCLUSIONS

It is believed that an investigation in depth would not corroborate Schwartz's contention that Mao's thoughts at the time of the Hunan Report represented an "exotic trend". The same investigation would show, as is shown in this paper, that Mao adhered, most probably, to the Comintern line until at least after the abortive Autumn Harvest Uprising and up to the time of his censure in November 1927.

A final point that should be mentioned in support of this conclusion is the following.

One must keep in mind the fact that there were three important entities operating in the field in 1927— the Central Committee of the CGP, the Comintern (including Borodin, Stalin and Roy), and Mao Tse-tung. At the beginning of 1927, the policies of all three coincided. As the year progressed, however, centrifugal forces came to play on the cohesiveness of the 'trio' and each entity became contemptuous of the others. It was previously cited that Mao's military actions were more favorably received
Moscow than by the CC of the CCP? To which of these groups should Mao have paid his allegiance?

Schram maintained that a letter written by Mao to the CC of the CCP in August (20), 1927 was to the CC, "outlandish". And perhaps it was. However, Mao began the letter with the fact that "A certain comrade had come to Hunan announcing new instructions from the International." He also wrote that "We expect that the Central Committee will without a doubt accept the instruction of the International, and we will moreover apply it in Hunan." This certainly depicts the fact that there were three entities at work in the field. Schram made no attempt to mention the identity of the "certain comrade" or to delve into the incident more closely. Could it not be possible that a Comintern representative gave Mao instructions officially or unofficially? Furthermore, this letter, which was so "outlandish" that it was rejected by the CC of the CCP, was answered by that group on September 5, 1927, approximately 2 to 3 days after the Uprisings had already begun. Did Schram expect Mao to reverse his field intentions once the Uprisings had begun?

It is believed that these points detract from the possibility of an "exotic trend" or deviationist hypothesis.

In addition, the following points related to the debate (and to Schwartz's book) should be exposed.

1 See Appendix A for contents of the letter.
2 Schram, op.cit., p.58.
3 Ibid.
4 Ch'ênh, op.cit., p.
1. The original text of Schwartz's book, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, was first printed in 1951. It was in this book that Wittfogel discovered many controversial points which were used in the 1960 debate. In 1951 Red China had emerged from its struggle victoriously, while the United States appeared to be the loser. It was in this atmosphere that the book was written.\(^1\) Needless to say, the prevailing political atmosphere\(\text{is}/\text{is different}.\) Also, during the 1950's new documents were uncovered and new speculations were expounded pertaining to many points noted in Schwartz's book. However, it appears that Dr. Schwartz had not taken advantage of these new sources and speculations, when he reissued his book, unrevised, in 1961. Therefore, materials which could have been used to support his "Maoist" thesis, or at least to modify it, were not used. This could create confusion as to what Dr. Schwartz really professes. For example, in his book in 1951 he placed great emphasis on the Hunan Report, as a sign of the deviant trend of Mao. However, in the debate article\(^2\) Schwartz backed away from his apparent original contention, when he asserted that the Hunan Report was only a landmark in Mao's groping towards the Maoist strategy.\(^3\) Yet, again in 1961, the book was reissued and in it Schwartz maintained his original position with respect to the Hunan Report.

2. This book makes one feel that perhaps Schwartz began his work

\(^1\) Personal conversation with Dr. Schwartz at Temple University, November , 1966.

\(^2\) Benjamin Schwartz, China Quarterly,"The Legend of Maoism", pp. 40-41.

\(^3\) Ibid.
with the idea that there existed a "Maoist" thesis. Many points fitted into the framework. However, many points did not. Consequently, when some points could not be easily fitted into the "Maoist" scheme, they were summarily dismissed or assigned an insignificant role. A good example of this phenomenon would be the Stalin telegram of June 1, 1927. This telegram was mentioned by Schwartz in both editions "en passant." However, several authors assigned to it significant importance, i.e., Brandt, Roy and North & Budin. It has been pointed out that the telegram was a crucial factor in the centrifugal forces which were to send Mao Tse-tung, the CC of the CCP and the Comintern in different directions.

3. Finally, a questionable point with respect to Wittfogel's position in the debate. In his 1951 article concerning China, Wittfogel expended great effort to edify the reader on the nature of Mao's unoriginality. In the article it was asserted that Mao drew heavily from the Leninist-Stalinist line. He went to great lengths to prove that Maoism was not a progeny of Marxism. However, it is interesting to note that in the debate article, Wittfogel "reversed his field" to prove that Maoism was a progeny of the Marxist-Leninist line. The reason for the change is not known at this time.

In summation, it is contended that Schwartz failed to support his sweeping generalizations (which pertained to Mao) with the required factual evidence. It is known that the evidence was available in 1960 and could have been used, at least, for revision of his book.

**Comparison of the following Points**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>MOSCOW</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The February, 1927 Hunan Report (Fourteen Great Achievements)(^1)</td>
<td>&quot;Theses&quot; of the 7th Plenum of the ECCI - December, 1926(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Organize the peasants into peasant associations.</td>
<td>I. The government must give maximum support to the peasant organizations, including the peasant unions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hitting the landlords politically.</td>
<td>II. The Canton Government must render the utmost support to the interests of the peasantry, and particularly to protect the peasants from the oppression and encroachments of the landlords, gentry and usurers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hitting the landlords economically.</td>
<td>III. a. Reduce rents to a minimum - the fixing of maximum rent jointly by the peasant union and representative of the revolutionary authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Prohibition on increasing rents and deposits; agitation for reduced rents and deposits.</td>
<td>b. Guarantee the tenant farmers perpetual leases of the land they cultivate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Prohibition on cancelling tenancies.</td>
<td>c. Grant loans to peasants at low interest, suppress usury, and support the various peasant mutual aid organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Reduction of interest.</td>
<td>IV. See point I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Smash the tu and tuan (rural administration).</td>
<td>V. Disarm the min-t’uan (People’s militia) and other armed forces of the landlords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. a. Overthrow the armed forces of the landlords and establishing those of the peasants.</td>
<td>--Arm the poor and middle peasants and subordinate all armed forces in the rural districts to the revolutionary authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Overthrowing the political power of the country magistrate and his bailiffs.</td>
<td>VI. The peasant’s committees will be the basis of the people’s government and the people’s army in rural district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Abolishing exorbitant levies.</td>
<td>XI. Abolish the numerous forms of taxes imposed upon the peasantry and substitute them with a single progressive agricultural tax.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. The cooperative movement.</td>
<td>--Regulate and reduce as far as possible the burden of taxation now being borne by the principal masses of the peasantry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^2\) North, Op. Cit., pp. 139-140.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 140.