edited by
Warren Weinstein

The Praeger Special Studies program—utilizing the most modern and efficient book production techniques and a selective worldwide distribution network—makes available to the academic, government, and business communities significant, timely research in U.S. and international economic, social, and political development.
Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa
For a good number of years, many students of African liberation movements have tended to reduce the cause of revolutionary movement impotence to internal ethnic problems. As an example of this school of thought, one Soviet observer noted that:

The extreme backwardness of social relations, the ill-defined social differentiation, the political backwardness of the peasants who are the main force behind the movement but the majority of whom are still under the sway of tribal or other prejudices, make revolution exceedingly difficult. Traditional factors... [are] decisive in African politics.1

Such interpretation is partly correct because of the legacies of tribal and ethnic differences in African history. It is true that Africa, past and present, has suffered from tribalism more than any other continent, particularly throughout the early years of independence. Currently leaders of independent African states have been wrestling with various political, social, and economic problems, many of which have been either directly or indirectly related to ethnic and tribal differences.

The leaders of revolutionary movements in the yet unliberated southern African countries are faced with similar, but more complicated, problems due to the nature of the struggle and the vulnerability of their claim for leadership. For these reasons anyone interested in the understanding of liberation movements cannot afford to ignore the negative influences on the continent.

Yet another important factor is the fact that international sources of aid and material assistance to revolutionary movements are oriented more towards needs of political and economic development than towards military support. The Sino-Soviet split and the arms embargo imposed by the West on the liberation movements have denied the majority of African countries arms and personnel to conduct armed struggle. The offers of material assistance that were made by the West during the early 1960s, for example, were conditional on the adherence to the principles of non-alignment of the South African regimes and the commitment to the policy of compromise with the apartheid regime.

The Sino-Soviet split, however, has had an important effect on the relationship between the liberation movements and their international supporters. As a result of the split, the Sino-Soviet bloc has been divided into two camps: one led by China and its allies, and the other led by the Soviet Union and its allies. The former group has provided more support to the liberation movements than the latter. The Sino-Soviet split has also affected the relationship between the liberation movements and the Western powers, as the former have been more willing to provide assistance to the movements than the latter.

In conclusion, the question of the role of ethnic and tribal differences in African liberation movements cannot be answered in a simple manner. The complexities of the situation require a careful analysis of the various factors that contribute to the impotence of revolutionary movements in Africa.
ignore the negative implications of ethnic and tribal differences on the conduct of revolutionary struggles in Africa.

Yet another important aspect has been ignored by many scholars, that is, the impact of regional and global political cleavages on the revolutionary movements in Africa, including such international cleavages as the cold war and the Sino-Soviet dispute, but also including possible ideological and/or personality differences among African leaders and/or countries. It is the thesis of this chapter that movement ties with external powers have often embroiled these movements in the larger cleavages, even to the extent that their revolutionary effort becomes "stalled."

The significance of such cleavages stems in part from the fact that internal armed struggle often has to depend on outside sources for material support, particularly for arms and personnel training. In a context where the countries able to provide assistance have differing ideological and political views, they would like to offer the offers of material aid and support that a liberation movement receives are usually tinged with partisan political pressures of greater or lesser subtlety.

The Sino-Soviet ideological rift provides some illustration. As many observers have argued, this larger conflict has inevitably had harmful repercussions on the conduct of the liberation struggles in Africa, particularly in that nationalistic groups and individuals within these groups have sometimes been forced to choose between support from Peking or support from Moscow. Since 1965 China has denied material and moral support to any movement that chose to side with the Soviet Union. This was contrary to its earlier policy, which had aimed at maintaining contacts with all competing revolutionary factions within the same country while also encouraging unity among them. In the early 1960s, for instance, Peking had urged the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC) to form a united front within South Africa. However, when the South African Communist Party, which was affiliated with the ANC, chose to side with Moscow, China moved to channel its material aid only to the PAC. Ideological conflict between the two communist powers also furthered divisions among revolutionary movements within Namibia (South West Africa) when South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) became the recipient of Soviet assistance; in response, China put all its weight behind South West Africa National Union (SWANU). Sino-Soviet disputes also had a divisive impact on the International Conference
in Support of the Liberation Movements of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa, which was held in Khartoum, the Sudan, in January 1969. The pro-China movements--such as Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and Comite Revolucionario de Moçambique (COREMO)--boycotted the meetings. They considered the conference to be an attempt to control the liberation struggles in Africa in order to further American-Soviet detente and dominance over world affairs. On the other hand, the pro-Soviet movements--such as African National Congress (ANC), Frente de Libertacuo de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), and Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU)--took a different stand and attended the conference which they considered to be a productive meeting.

Because liberation movements typically have not received material aid from western Europe or the United States of America, they have had to rely solely on the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and eastern Europe for the supply of arms they need to carry out their armed struggles. This places the communist countries in a strategic position by which they might influence the direction of the liberation struggles. If they were united in their revolutionary outlooks, they could provide massive support to particular nationalist groups. Similarly they could swing their support so as to encourage greater unity among competing revolutionary factions. Conversely divisions within the communist camp might have an adverse effect, particularly when aid is extended in line with ideological stance.

The African revolutionary movements are thus quite susceptible to such pressures because of their urgent need for external assistance. Another source of susceptibility, however, lies in their own organizational weaknesses. In particular internal dissension within movements, while perhaps inevitable in view of their almost impossible odds, nevertheless fosters a volatile environment in which leaders may be changed or in which new factions may develop at any time. As a result little long-term organizational stability is achieved and, in turn, the ideological positions of any movement are often not regarded as firm. Consequently contending major powers often find it fruitful to monitor closely the internal changes within movements.

Some amount of disagreement among revolutionary leaders is to be expected as to how best to liberate their country. The leaders for dissent and organization and to some degree, from one to another, with each other. The existence of such instability among revolution can be an impetus for faction or leadership as well as an instability--that external donor will develop policies with the state. However, this instability, and regional and national outgrowth of revolution's own faction's independence of other target states.

It should be recognized that revolutionary world, nearby countries, and organizations--cannot have a political effect not only in the African movements, but also in the entire world. Yet host countries that conduct the most radical revolutionary activities, because Zambia and Zimbabwe (ZAPU and ZANU) have activities on its soil, are perhaps the very least interested in its land. Zamia is not to form a unit because of political sources in order to avoid conflict.

From another point of view, leaders in Zambia and other neighboring countries are more likely to be concerned with the ideological leadership than with the ideological position of MPLA, a movement that has been described as to allow exclusion...
Portuguese Colom- 
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country. The international political environment in which these leaders operate, however, has made it relatively easy for dissident factions to break away from a parent organi-
zation and to receive encouragement, wittingly or unwitting-
ly, from outsiders. External support also enables 
leaders of independent revolutionary movements to compete 
with each other for such assistance. Moreover the exis-
tence of such divisive external pressures may frequently 
acerbate leadership differences and personality clashes 
among revolutionary leaders. Support from external powers 
can be an important source of autonomy for any dissident 
faction or leader. In the absence of internal sources of 
assistance, it is usually crucial that a movement turn to 
outside assistance; because of a movement's own internal 
instability—and because of the multiplicity of possible 
e external donors—the likelihood is great that external aid 
will develop political uses. This circumstance par-
cularly applies to revolutionary leaders in their conflict 
with the state leaders they are trying to overthrow. How-
ever, dissident revolutionaries can also play on global 
and regional cleavages in order to get support for their 
own faction's efforts to "spin off" from or to stay inde-
dent of other movements seeking to liberate the same 
target state. 

It should also be noted that, in a divided revolu-
tionary world, the role of host states—neighboring or 
early countries that offer sanctuary to revolutionary 
groups—cannot be underestimated. Their importance lies 
not only in the amount of aid they give to the liberation 
vements, but also in provision of training camps, san-
tuary, and a means for channeling outside assistance. 
Yet host countries can also have negative impact on the 
uct of the revolutionary struggle. For example be-
cause Zambia allows both Rhodesian liberation movements 
(ZAPU and ZANU) to maintain sanctuaries and headquarters 
its soil, it is to some extent sanctioning and rein-
forcing the differences between these rival groups. At 
the very least, by allowing both movements to operate from 
its land, Zambia has removed pressure from these movements 
to form a united front and to combine their scarce re-
ources in order to liberate their country. 

From another point of view, however, the political 
leaders in Zaire may have simply contributed to the con-
tinued existence of the rivalries among Angolan revolu-
tionary leadership—Holden Roberto (GRAE/FINLA), Agostinho 
Neto (MPLA), and Jonas Savimbi (UNITA)—by their decision 
to allow exclusive sanctuary to the GRAE/FINLA. Such
action may also be detrimental to revolutionary unity since it could force greater separation—both ideological and geographical—between factions. Indeed the MPLA eventually did move its headquarters from Kinshasa to the Congo (Brazzaville)—a host country which has frequently been at odds with Zaire on ideological matters.

These examples suggest that political cleavages existing in regional and international spheres could easily enable revolutionary leaders from within the same movement or in different movements within the same country to rival each other for external support and positions of power, thereby fragmenting the liberation movement and inevitably weakening the revolutionary struggle.

**IMPACT OF "EXTERNAL CLEAVAGES"

In the study of African liberation movements, this side of the "external cleavages" has so far been overlooked. For this reason, there is a need to examine, impartially but systematically, several examples of the impact of the African and global cleavages on the revolutionary struggle in Africa. Because of the relatively large number of revolutionary movements in Africa, the discussion in this chapter will be limited to an examination of the impact of regional and international cleavages on the liberation struggle in Portuguese Africa and in Southern Rhodesia which are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Movement/Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>GRAE/FLNA (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilo Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLING (Frente de Luta pela Independencia Nacional da Guine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COREMO (Comita Revolucionario de Mocambique)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be kept in mind that movements are fragile entities. For example, UDENANO, MANU, and others had been expelled and formed new parties in Mozambique, MANU, MAP, and other factions eventually COREMO—in June 1969. An alition of smaller parties like Roberto's Bakongo band.

One of the major problems for each country is how the leaders refer to such differences. They may or may not have an impact. Either they are a negative or positive influence on the movement. For example, COREMO never existed at the outside, two or more movements or organizations, following the lead of its local supporters. Nevertheless, different sources of influences between the factions. To support this position, several conclusions can be drawn:

First, in all cases, movements working for a cause are weak. Such a lack of a unitary struggle in many instances of conflict mobilized to defeat the other, armed clashes between ZANU. Thus it increas...
revolutionary unity since both ideological and political cleavages exist. The two could easily entwine the same movements of the same country to rival positions of power, movement and inevitably state.

"POLITICAL CLEAVAGES"

In the case of liberation movements, this has so far been over-shadowed by a need to examine, inter alia, examples of the internal cleavages on the revolu-
tionary side of the relatively young movements in Africa, the continent limited to an examina-
tion of international cleavages in Portuguese Africa and in Angola.

Revolucionario da Fronte Nacional de Liberta\c{c}ao

(Revolucionario de Libertacao

da Fronte Nacional de la Independencia

Angola)

Renaissance para a Independencia

Angola

(Resurrection para la Independencia

Angola)

Movimento da Independencia

Angola

(Movimiento de la Independencia

Angola)

Movimento de Libertacao de Mocambique

(Movimiento de Libertacao de Mocambique)

Southern Rhodesia

ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union)

ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union)

FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe)

It should be kept in mind that several of the liberation movements are fragile coalitions of smaller political parties. For example FRELIMO was created by a merger of UDENAMO, MANU, and UNAMI in June 1962. After several leaders had been expelled from the parent organization they formed new parties such as UDENAMO-Monomotapa, UDENAMO-Mozambique, MANU, MANCO, and UNAMI; these new political factions eventually merged into one large organization—COREMO—in June 1965. The GRAE in Angola is also a coalition of smaller parties which have aligned with Holden Roberto's Bakongo-based UPA.

One of the major reasons several movements exist for each country is because of leadership differences (many authors refer to such differences as "squabbles"). These differences have manifested themselves in at least two ways. Either they have resulted in the defection of one or more leaders from the parent movement, as was the case with COREMO, thus leading to the creation of a spin-off movement seeking to liberate the same country. Or there existed at the outset of the violence phase of revolution, two or more movements with two or more sets of leaders, organizations, followers, tactics, ideologies, and external supporters. Neither set of leaders wanted to become subordinate to the other set and, as a result, rivalries ensued. It appears that for both categories just mentioned the primary objective of the liberation of the target country was replaced by the desire of each revolutionary group to maintain its identity and autonomy from the others. Undoubtedly the existence of independent, external sources of support has tended to reinforce the differences between the leaders of the contending revolutionary factions. To support this view Table 8.1 is presented.

Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 8.1. First, in all cases, there are two or more revolutionary movements working for the liberation of the target country. Such a lack of a united front could place the revolutionary struggle in jeopardy since their limited resources are not mobilized to defeat their common enemy and occasionally are used against each other. For example there are reports of armed clashes between movements such as GRAE-MPLA and ZAPU-ZANU. Thus it increases animosity among the rival groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Revolution Group(s)</th>
<th>Spin-Off (S) or Independent (I)&lt;sup&gt;(b)</th>
<th>Sanctuary</th>
<th>Primary Sources of External Aid</th>
<th>ALC-OAU Recognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>GRAE/FLNA</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>S (GRAE)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea (Bissau)</td>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>USSR-China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FLING</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>USSR-China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COREMO</td>
<td>S (FRELIMO)</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Rhodesia</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>S (ZAPU)</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Target country refers to the country which is to be liberated.

<sup>b</sup>Spin-off or Independent refers to the origin of the revolutionary movement. If the movements for a particular target country developed independently from another and maintained their autonomy, they are classified as independent. If the movement is the result of a split that has occurred in a parent movement, then it is considered to be a spin-off movement.

within the same country and diverts their attention away from their ultimate goal which is the liberation of their land. Secondly Table 8.1 shows that liberation movements have to depend heavily on the communist countries for material and financial assistance since no aid was forthcoming from the West. The communist involvement in the African revolutionary struggle is a matter of life and death.

All liberation movements, except GRAE and FLING, are recipients of assistance from the Soviet Union and/or China. Soviet material and moral support have been extended to the parent movements such as MPLA, the PAIGC, FRELIMO, and ZAPU, while the Chinese have supported the three spin-off movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Southern Rhodesia—UNITA, COREMO, and ZANU, respectively. It seems that China has encouraged dissenters to break away and to form their own organizations. In return for material and personnel training, China has generally insisted that the recipient groups must sign a statement condemning Soviet revisionism and Western neocolonialism. Some movements have managed to avoid signing the statement and have antagonized Moscow by asking Peking to channel its aid through the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In fact both FRELIMO and PAIGC have managed to receive aid from both China and the Soviet Union. One reason is that both movements have been relatively successful in carrying out their armed struggle against Portugal. Another contributing factor is that there has been no serious challenge to their leadership inside the territories; both COREMO and FLING are small movements and their influence has not been felt yet in the struggle to liberate their countries.

Bruce Larkin hypothesized the following motivations for Chinese involvement in African liberation movements. His hypotheses tend to be supported by the information presented in Table 8.1 shown earlier:

1. If a nationalist organization becomes friendly to the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, China will probably aid a competing nationalist organization if a viable one exists.

2. If two organizations are competing for influence in an exile community and one accepts Soviet aid, China will cultivate the other one.

3. If a group is the only radical nationalist movement conducting effective operations in a territory, China will give aid to that group even if the Soviet Union also gives it aid. (The case of South West Africa suggests a qualification to this hypothesis. If China has identified
herself with one group, which becomes ineffective but maintains a bare or nominal existence, and if Soviet support has gone to a competing group, China may continue to give her support to the first group.)

4. If two or more movements in a territory refuse to unite and yet refrain from mutually exclusive claims, China will attempt to maintain relations with persons or factions within both groups.

One might conclude, then, that China's concern has been less with the success or failure of a specific liberation movement than with its competition with the USSR. It is apparent that China has responded to Soviet initiatives among revolutionary leaders by seeking other revolutionary leaders to support or other movements to aid.

Another important source of aid is the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (ALC-OAU) which functions to coordinate assistance both from African countries and from outside the continent, and to grant recognition as well as legitimacy to selected revolutionary movements. Since ALC-OAU recognition is dependent upon demonstrated success in the military activities in the territories, Soviet and Chinese assistance have become essential in order to initiate successful military campaigns during the early years of the movement's life. The OAU recognition makes it possible for these movements to receive aid from ALC-OAU. In Guinea (Bissau) and in Mozambique, only one national liberation movement has been recognized and assisted by the ALC-OAU; in Angola and Rhodesia, multiple recognition prevails. It should be pointed out that ALC-OAU has worked closely with host nations that border on target countries. It has allowed these host governments to administer assistance to the liberation movements that operate from within their borders.

One must assume that the overriding objective of most African liberation movements is to liberate the target country from white minority rule. Yet it appears that external involvement in these liberation movements is having a negative effect on the attainment of that goal. In their drive for control over tactics, strategy, and ideological commitment of the revolutionary movement, leaders within a movement compete with each other for external, independent sources of support.

Let us review separately the situations in each of the Portuguese colonies and in Southern Rhodesia. Two general issues underlying this study include: whether the Sino-Soviet competition to capture the leadership in the

Third World has affected African continent; at host states have had liberation struggles

Holden Roberto's such leaders in Zaire given his movement, liberation of Angola, receive sanctuary in to merge other rival basis, that is, membe join the GRAB as indi. Such demands, however sanctuary elsewhere. quarters from Kinshasha.

It might be argued for the balkanization by allowing UNITA, Kinshasa-based Angolish headquarters and the Zambian government's enclaves. In 1968 U of their raids on the vital for the export port of Lobito for sh UNITA caused Savimbi to Cairo and later inside to training area importing arms through. It can be concluded they allow UNITA to use it, they refrained from a could cause severe ec this gentleman's agree had to give priority Thus Zambia has prove sure—a matter which tangles in Southern Afri ALC-OAU has also rein Angolan liberation gr and support at one ti MPLA, although this w
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Northern Rhodesia. Two gen-
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the leadership in the

Third World has affected the revolutionary struggle on the
African continent; and whether the OAU and the African
host states have had any influence on the conduct of the
liberation struggles in Africa.

Angola

Holden Roberto's personal friendships over time with
such leaders in Zaire as Adoula, Bemboko, and Mobutu have
given his movement, the GRAE, a prominent place in the
liberation of Angola. The GRAE is the only movement to
receive sanctuary in Zaire. Zaire's leaders have sought
to merge other rival factions into the GRAE on an unequal
basis, that is, members of rival factions were asked to
join the GRAE as individual members and not as a bloc.
Such demands, however, have forced other movements to seek
sanctuary elsewhere. For example the MPLA moved its head-
quart from Kinshasa to Brazzaville and, later, to
Lusaka.

It might be argued that Zambia has been responsible
for the balkanization of the Angolan liberation movement
by allowing UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi who left the
Kinshasa-based group of Holden Roberto in 1964, to estab-
lish headquarters and to have sanctuary in Zambia, while
the Zambian government permitted the MPLA the same con-
veniences. In 1968 UNITA was banned from Zambia because
of their raids on the Benguela Railroad which has been vital
for the export of Zambia's copper via Angola to the
port of Lobito for shipment overseas. The banning of
UNITA caused Savimbi to move his headquarters first to
Cairo and later inside Angola. This ban denied him ac-
 cess to training areas for guerrillas and to a means for
importing arms through Zambia for transfer into Angola.9
It can be concluded that President Kaunda was willing to
allow UNITA to use his country as sanctuary as long as
they refrained from attacking the railway whose disruption
could cause severe economic problems for Zambia. When
this gentleman's agreement was violated by UNITA, Kaunda
had to give priority to his country's economic needs.
Thus Zambia has proven to be sensitive to economic pres-
sure—a matter which cannot help the revolutionary strug-
gles in Southern Africa and especially in Angola. The
ALC-OAU has also reinforced existing cleavages between
Angolan liberation groups by having extended recognition
and support at one time or another to the GRAE and to the
MPLA, although this was done in accordance with the ALC

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policy of recognizing and assisting only one movement per territory. Time and time again the ALC-OAU has been forced to withdraw recognition and aid from a given liberation movement when it has failed to maintain an active fighting force. Under these circumstances the ALC-OAU would shift its recognition to another liberation movement in the same country which has carried out successful military campaigns against the enemy. In doing so the OAU has not contributed to the reduction of intergroup rivalries, but in fact has exacerbated them.

Finally the states which have served as the principal sources of aid and support for the three Angolan movements have further reinforced existing cleavages among these groups. GRAE, for example, has received no aid from China. Their aid from the Soviet Union was interrupted following the 1964 Congolese rebellion which resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations between Kinshasa and Moscow. For this reason, GRAE has had to rely for the most part on Zaire's aid in order to continue its guerrilla campaigns against Portugal. GRAE has been given exclusive access to Angola's border with Zaire. In return it has assisted the Zairian army in preventing the pro-Soviet MPLA fighters from crossing Zaire en route from their bases in Congo (Brazzaville) to fighting zones in northern Angola. On the other hand the MPLA has received support from the Soviet Union, while UNITA has become a recipient of China's aid. China's involvement in Angola had been an apparent response to the Sino-Soviet competition to capture the revolutionary leadership in Africa. It is apparently part of a practice by Peking to support spin-off movements in southern Africa—such as COREMO (Mozambique) and ZANU (Rhodesia)—and to encourage them to side with China. With the existence of so many sources of external support, each with its own favored recipient, there has been no compelling reason, for example, for Angolan revolutionary factions to give up their desire to stay independent from other factions and to lead eventually a united liberation movement.

Guinea-Bissau

The PAIGC was founded in the mid-1950s in Bissau, the capital of Portuguese Guinea. Amilcar Cabral, founder of the party supported by aid from the Soviet Union, established a sanctuary in the Republic of Guinea. Sekou Touré, President of Guinea, allowed the PAIGC to establish military bases along the border. The PAIGC, under Cabral's leadership, was recognized by the U.S. but was not recognized by the U.S. because it was considered a communist movement.

The fears of the revolutionary regime in the Portuguese colonies were not without foundation. The PAIGC, under the leadership of Cabral, was considered to be a communist movement by the Portuguese colonial authorities. Hence, the Senegalese government was more willing to support the Portuguese military, in order to prevent a communist insurrection in Senegal.

There exists in Senegal a tradition of resistance against Portuguese colonial rule. This community had been a source of support for the Portuguese, who have been fighting for independence since the early 1960s. Eventually the PAIGC was able to establish a presence in Senegal, but its support was limited by the Portuguese military presence in the colonies.

It should be pointed out that the African liberation movement of the 1960s was not only against the colonial powers but also for the liberation of the Portuguese-speaking countries. The PAIGC was one of the main movements fighting for independence in Portuguese Africa.
military bases along its border with Portuguese Guine.

The PAIGC, under Cabral, was able to maintain a high
degree of control over its own affairs within the
Republic of Guinea. Leopold Senghor, President of the
neighboring
Republic of Senegal, had not been on good terms with the
ideologically more radical Guinean regime. His hostility
to Toure carried over to liberation movements supported by
Touré.

Gibson noted that

The fears of ... Senghor concerning the revolutionary militancy of Sekou Toure's regime in the neighboring Republic of Guinea naturally extended quickly to the leftest PAIGC, which was backed by Conakry. Hence, the Senegalese Government was more than willing to support, if not actively foster, rivals to the PAIGC.

There exists in Senegal a very large community of Portuguese Guinean refugees estimated to be as large as 65,000. This community had been represented, generally speaking, by a number of smaller groups, many of which joined together in 1963 to form FLING. (FLING claimed to be an African party designed to liberate Portuguese Guine. No reference was made by them to liberate the Cape Verde Islands.) Eventually by 1967 the relatively inactive FLING was overshadowed by military successes of the PAIGC within Guinea. Senghor, forced to rethink his antipathy toward the PAIGC, signed an agreement with that movement and allowed it to establish a sanctuary and military base along its border with Portuguese Guine. Despite the obvious improvement in Senegalese-PAIGC relations, complaints of harassment were still made by the PAIGC cadre as late as 1970. Nonetheless, Senegal has become an important sanctuary to the PAIGC.

It should be pointed out that PAIGC is one of the two African liberation movements that has received aid from both the Soviet Union and China. This is probably because the PAIGC has been relatively successful in its military campaigns in Guinea (Bissau) and is now in control of a significant part of the territory. In addition PAIGC is the sole liberation force conducting effective operations against the Portuguese inside the territory. Because PAIGC is apparently close to achieving its goal, neither China nor the Soviet Union can afford to lose its friendship at this time.
There are now two movements which seek to liberate Mozambique from Portuguese control—FRELIMO and COREMO. FRELIMO, founded in 1962, is the older of the two and has established sanctuary, training camps, and headquarters in Tanzania. It has been officially recognized by the ALCOAU and is the recipient of its aid and support. FRELIMO received support from both the USSR and China.

COREMO is a spin-off of FRELIMO. The leaders of this movement were at one time or another high-ranking members of FRELIMO but had been expelled by the Central Committee of FRELIMO. In order to continue their efforts, the expelled leaders needed to establish another organization working for liberation on their own. For example, after having been expelled from FRELIMO, Gumane and Mobundu (former Deputy Secretary General and Secretary General, respectively) formed a new revolutionary party in Cairo. Gwambe (a former treasurer of FRELIMO) formed a new party in Uganda. Eventually these splinter parties regrouped into a coalition party known as COREMO. On the origin of COREMO, Gibson has written that

The Zambians hoped to effect the reunification of the Mozambiquan nationalist movement, but Mondlane walked out of the talks after the others had refused to disband their groups and join FRELIMO as individuals. The remaining delegates then united their five organizations in the new COREMO.

COREMO was allowed to establish its headquarters and sanctuary in Zambia with Zambia thereby admitting COREMO’s right to exist. Once the split among Mozambiquan revolutionary leaders had taken place, the Chinese supported COREMO. Without damaging their relationship with FRELIMO, Peking had no difficulty in extending aid to COREMO since the spin-off group generally operated in the southern part of Mozambique. For the most part the parent organization has stayed out of this area, directly across from the Zambian borders. It is expected that China would continue to provide aid to both FRELIMO and COREMO as long as the two groups operate in different geographical regions and as long as they are physically separated by a buffer zone. There are signs that Peking has increased its volume of aid to the liberation movements in southern Africa, including COREMO, for COREMO, which used to be a Moscow defector to Portugal, member of FRELIMO Central party is commanded by Union, not wishing to let anybody have, still cont Under these circumstances divided ideologically Thus external aid has only between leaders country but also the

Similar occurrences in Rhodesian liberation camps in Tanzania recognized by the ALCOAU. Zambia supported and Rhodesian liberation rival parties to esta Reinforcing the separ that they receive as the Soviet Union aids dize another revolution alternative but to se

In 1967 when ZANU (the Asian Peoples’ Solidarity movement, was aing ZANU’s leaders of counting of the "pro-

The extent to which the main objective—liber objective of the pers- ment, ideology, and/o Grundy when he wrote

The physical ZANU has been a- sional report on ganging among African town Zambian author
which seek to liberate Mozambique, and COREMO. The leaders of the two and have camps and headquarters in Mozambique, and headquarters in Angola, which are recognized by the OAU. FRELIMO received the support of the Mozambique People's Liberation Movement (FRELIMO) from the Mozambique government, and COREMO received the support of South Africa. For example, after FRELIMO and Coremo, two people were killed in the Mozambique government conflict. The Mozambique government decided to support COREMO, and COREMO was reorganized as a new party. COREMO's new party was regrouped as FRELIMO, and COREMO was dissolved.

On the origin of the reunification of COREMO and FRELIMO, however, the Mozambique government refused to participate in the reunification. COREMO's leadership was divided, and FRELIMO was unable to agree on a new leadership. The Mozambique government and COREMO leaders refused to negotiate, and the Mozambique government decided to support COREMO.

Southern Rhodesia

Similar occurrences can be seen in the case of Southern Rhodesian liberation movements. ZAPU and ZANU maintained headquarters and sanctuary in Zambia, each having training camps in Tanzania, and each has been officially recognized by the OAU. It can be argued that Kaunda of Zambia supported both parties to establish their headquarters in Lusaka. Reinforcing the separation of these two groups is the fact that they receive assistance from London or Peking. Since the Soviet Union aids ZAPU and has no interest in subsidizing another revolutionary group in Rhodesia, ZANU has no alternative but to seek assistance from China.

In 1967 when ZANU applied for membership in the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPS), ZAPU took the lead in the revolution. ZAPU, the rival movement, was able to block its admission by accusing ZANU's leaders of being "pro-Peking extremists," thus counting the "pro-Moscow" majority votes. The extent to which rival groups have put aside their main objective--liberation--and have replaced it with the objective of the persistence of the revolutionary movement, ideology, and/or leadership was referred to by Grundy when he wrote that

The physical struggle between ZAPU and ZANU has been very disruptive. Occasional reports have appeared of press-ganging among Zimbabwean refugees in the African townships of Lusaka. At one point, Zambia authorities expelled 52 Rhodesians...
to Tanzania. Zambia became particularly alarmed with the strong-armed methods used in search of potential guerrillas, particularly when ZAPU and ZANU preyed upon Zambian citizens. Dar-es-Salaam has also seen its share of internecine threats, fights, and assassinations between competing nationalist movements and within them as well. 18

Yet despite the pettiness of revolutionary infighting, Kaunda and the ALC-OAU have been unable to force these movements to cooperate with each other on a long-term basis. As long as these movements have independent sources of support, they have no reason to give up their autonomy by merging on an equal basis with any other movement. For almost nine years, the ALC-OAU repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted reconciliation between the two movements. Their leaders however showed no sign of compromise: ZAPU refused to acknowledge that ZANU had any followers inside Rhodesia, while ZANU rejected any proposal to form a political organization headed by Joshua Nkomo. It was not until after violent clashes in ZAPU in 1970 that its leaders sought reconciliation with ZANU. This offer was accepted by ZANU, but failed to produce immediate results because of the ideological and tribal splits within ZAPU. Concerned over their failure to bring about unification, Kaunda warned "they have to choose between coming together or forfeiting Zambia's readiness to accommodate them." Shortly thereafter it was announced that members from ZAPU and ZANU had merged to form the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). Kaunda gave his blessing to the new organization, in the hope that both of both ZAPU and ZANU would join FROLIZI. However, when this failed to happen, he began to pressure ZANU leaders including Herbert Chitebo as well as J. Z. Moyo's faction of ZAPU, all of whom had so far refused to join the new movement. Such pressure resulted in the formation of the joint ZAPU-ZANU military command that seems to be effective in carrying out commando raids against Rhodesia. 19

REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCES

An interesting consequence of the need for allies by revolutionary factions and the fact that they have been unable to join with other groups from the same country, is the alliance system worked out with similar countries. It is designed to share information; to coordinate movements abroad; to coordinate activities as possible; and to share weapons and training.
is the alliance system that nationalist movements have worked out with similar revolutionary groups from other countries. It is designed to provide them with a vehicle to share information; to jointly publicize their cases abroad; to coordinate their military operations as much as possible; and to solicit more aid.

Ideologically akin revolutionary movements in the Portuguese territories—PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO—joined together in the early 1960s to form the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP). An obvious exclusion from this group was Holden Roberto's GRAE. In another attempt at alliance SWAPO formed a working relationship with UNITA in July 1964 but this alliance caused the MPLA to put pressure on SWAPO to sever its ties with UNITA and to support the MPLA. Recent reports indicate that MPLA and SWAPO are cooperating in Angola.

These pressures were crudely applied at the 1969 Khartoum conference of Mosoleine liberation movements. Here, in addition, leaders of the ANC called privately for an alliance with SWAPO similar to their party's tie-up with ZAPU.20

In 1967 ANC and ZAPU announced the formation of a "military alliance between their two movements and... proclaim[ed] that their forces were already engaged in a long-term operation that was designed to carry them through Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa."21 After their first joint military adventure in Wankie, Rhodesia, had turned into a disaster, ZANU leaders began to express a desire to change tactics for the use of the ANC guerrillas. They argued that

the greatest help we can get from ANC is for ANC to wage intensive guerrilla warfare in South Africa. If ANC can pin down the whole South African force inside South Africa, then Zimbabweans shall be left with Smith alone without South African aid. As it is now, the ANC and [ZAPU] alliance has made it easy for Smith and Vorster to unite and concentrate their forces to slaughter Zimbabweans.22

Their alliance however has grown weaker because of successive military failures, tension, and ethnic feuds--
matters which have weakened the fighting spirit and resulted in desertion from ZANU's rank and file.

Although these alliances are small and have very little military significance, their existence is a testimony to the need for regional coordination in order to carry out successful revolutions in southern Africa. It seems that alliances among revolutionary movements such as the one that exists between ZANU and FRELIMO may prove to be a major step on the road to independence. As areas in adjacent countries become liberated, new sanctuaries may become available to an allying revolutionary movement. These alliances among revolutionary movements from different territories are taking place in spite of external involvement and not because of it. What the revolutionary groups are unable to get from other movements seeking to liberate the same target or from external sources, they are getting from ideologically akin revolutionary movements which are operating in adjacent territories.

Recently determined efforts have been made to convince leaders of movements seeking to liberate the same country to merge their forces, energies, and resources. For example Zambia had brought about a fragile reconciliation between ZAPU and ZANU. It appears that the new movement, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), has not attracted most of the leaders of both ZAPU and ZANU. There has also been a fragile reconciliation between the MPA and the GRAE. Although attempts at reconciliation have proven futile in the past, this should not discourage external revolutionary supporters from making more efforts to bring about unification of liberation movements within a single country because such unity will facilitate and speed up the process of liberation in the remaining white-minority-ruled territories in southern Africa.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

Two major factors have been examined to determine the degree of contribution to the failure or success of the liberation struggles in Africa. First it has been argued that Sino-Soviet rivalry has caused a sharp division in the rank and file of revolutionary leadership in southern Africa. In their competition for Third World leadership, Moscow and Peking have directly encouraged dissension among nationalist leadership within the same country; they have made it possible for dissenters to break away from the parent organization.

Struggles have had not made moves to them. Thus it can activities can be detected in Africa. Undoubtedly, if there is division among their limited resources, there is an effective armament. For instance the movements of the CONCREGA for the struggles of the MPA in Rome in 1970, and some struggles in southern Africa likely to increase the differences between the same country. Second, the OAU, has actively been the revolutionary struggle by extending recognition to factions seeking to liberate most part they have had various revolutionary experiences and to unite because of the seriousness of their work such as Kaunda and Nkomo. The effect reconciliation should not be disregarded: a conference at Moshi between FRELIMO and UNITA for the Front against Portuguese forces in the conference however brought FRELIMO offer for 6 of the captured central committees.

It should be pointed out that are also trying to bring rank and file not only their counterparts in the year the MPA and FRELIMO to form the Supreme Council. However, UNITA was the fact that Savimbi had

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from the parent organizations and to form their own revo-
utionary factions. Such spin-off movements would have
been unlikely to come into existence if the Chinese or So-
viets had not made material and moral assistance available
to them. Thus it can be said that the Chinese and Soviet
activities can be detrimental to the liberation cause in
Africa. Undoubtedly revolution could not be served prop-
erly if there is division among revolutionaries and if
their limited resources are not pooled together to carry
out an effective armed struggle against their common enemy.
For instance the invitations issued only to the pro-Moscow
movements of the CONCIP to attend a conference in support
of the struggles of the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies
in Rome in 1970, 24 could hardly serve the revolutionary
struggles in southern Africa. On the contrary it was
likely to increase hostility and to sharpen ideological
differences between liberation movements belonging to the
same country. Secondly host states and, to a lesser de-
gree, the ALG-OAU, have furthered the fragmentation of
the revolutionary struggles in Africa. This has been done
by extending recognition and material support to several
factions seeking to liberate the same country. For the
most part they have failed to exert enough pressure on
various revolutionary groups to reconcile their differ-
ences and to unite behind their cause. Being aware of
the seriousness of this problem, several African leaders
such as Kaunda and Nyerere have made numerous attempts to
effect reconciliation. The OAU efforts in this direction
should not be disregarded. For instance the OAU sponsored
a conference at Moshi in 1967 to reconcile differences
between FRELIMO and COREMO in order to bring about a united
front against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. The
conference however broke up when COREMO turned down a
FRELIMO offer for 6 out of the 15 places on a newly struc-
tured central committee.

It should be pointed out that revolutionary leaders
are also trying to bring about unity among revolutionary
rank and file not only in a single country but also with
their counterparts in the southern Africa region. Last
year the MPLA and FNLA buried their animosity and joined
to form the Supreme Council for the liberation of Angola.
However, UNITA was left out of the Council, despite the
fact that Savimbi had expressed his interest to join it. 25

In the final analysis, global and regional supporters
of African liberation movements should review the role of
their involvement in liberation movements. Assuming that
their primary objective is the liberation of African people
from white minority rule, the aid that they give must re-
fect that aim. Chinese-Soviet competition has caused
those governments to support competing revolutionary fac-
tions to the detriment of revolutionary solidarity. Zamb-
ia and Tanzania have also fostered cleavages among revo-
lutionary factions by permitting several factions from the
same country to operate independently from each other.
Zaire's leaders have sought to foster the predominance of
the GRAE in the Angolan liberation struggle. Senegalese
leaders have allowed their personal rivalries to interfere
with the objective of gaining independence for Guine-
Bissau. Even the ALC-OAU has not pursued a rational pol-
icy toward African liberation movements because they have
given recognition and support to more than one movement
from the same country.

Once African liberation movement leaders appreciate
to a greater extent the fact that external sources of
assistance have sought to further their own ideological
interests at the cost of national liberation, they may
see the need to bring about national unity among the revolu-
tionary rank and file in order to carry out a successful
armed struggle in a given country. Thus when liberation
movements have liberated themselves from internal rival-
ries fed by such external cleavages, their chances for
revolutionary success will have been greatly improved.

NOTES

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17. Gibson, op. cit., p. 177.
20. Ibid., p. 138.
21. Ibid., p. 165.
22. Ibid., p. 166.